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ABSTRACT 
The UK National Health Service (the ‘NHS’), encouraged by the 2011 report Innovation 
Health and Wealth, Accelerating Adoption and Diffusion in the NHS, and empowered by the 
Health and Social Care Act 2012, is in the process of adopting a new agenda for stimulating 
innovation in healthcare. For this, the bodies, body materials, and confidential health 
information of NHS patients may be co-opted. We explain why, without refinement, this 
brings the NHS into a moral conflict with its basic goal of providing a universal healthcare 
service. To put NHS databases at the disposal of industry, without properly addressing 
ethical concerns regarding the privacy, autonomy and moral integrity of patients and 
without requiring a ‘kick-back’ to enhance the service that the NHS is set up to provide, is 
inappropriate. As this paper shows, with reference to an example from the commercial 
arena of direct-to-consumer genetic testing, it is crucial that patient and public trust in the 
NHS is not eroded in the process. 
KEYWORDS: Data; Health and Social Care Act 2012; innovation; NHS; research; trust 
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In this country we can no longer accept the traditional paternalistic 
attitude of the NHS, that the benefits of medicine, science and 
research are somehow self-evident regardless of the wishes of 
patients or their families
1
 
 
The greater the number of patients involved in research, the wider 
the public benefit
2
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a truism to say that biomedical research brings us many benefits; but its further 
continuance requires the trust of those whose bodies, tissues and data are used in that 
research, whether commercial, altruistic or merely epidemiological.
3
 This paper explains 
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  Alan Milburn, Government Health Secretary, 29 January 2001, quoted in: Department of 
Health, Building the Information Core: Protecting and Using Confidential Patient 
Information – A Strategy for the NHS (DoH: London, 2001), at 8. 
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Diffusion in the NHS  (DoH: London, 2011), at 17. 
3
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how recent developments in the UK risk undermining that trust and thereby threaten to 
hamper future medical research. 
Altruism, confidence in science and medical progress, trust in researchers and trust in 
research projects are quite common persuaders for people to participate in biobank 
research.
4
 Various studies
5
 have shown that individuals donating biological samples and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rethinking the Tuskegee syphilis study, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
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Anchor Books. 
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example: G Haddow,‘"We only did it because he asked us": Gendered accounts of 
participation in a population genetic data collection’ (2009) 69 (7) Social Science & 
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phenotypic information consider this to be an altruistic act that might help others. Highly 
relevant in this context is the importance of the donors’ trust in the researchers and the 
research performed. As Graeme Laurie and Emily Postan have argued in this journal, the 
governance of research relationships depends crucially on trust and that trust ‘is self-
evidently vital … to the future viability of all research involving human participants’.
6
 Indeed, 
the trust of current and future people (both patients and healthy citizens) is essential for the 
success of health research. Trust in their doctor or a researcher or an institution is a major 
reason for people to agree to take part in research.
7
 Loss of trust could lead to less public 
participation in research and thus hamper genetic and, more generally, health research.
8
 
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 provided for the creation of a corporate body, the 
‘Information Centre’, which is empowered to collect and collate the hospital and personal 
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physician (GP, general practitioner, or family doctor) data of all British citizens.
9
 This body 
has meanwhile been set up and already holds hospital data. It will begin to ‘harvest’ GP data 
in March 2014. In January 2014, the NHS sent all British households a leaflet describing the 
data collection,
10
 which is to begin in Spring 2014, and offering an ‘opt-out’ option, which 
requires GPs to amend their records to include two abstruse computer codes. The leaflet, as 
the present authors and many other citizens (see below) have discovered, arrived together 
with the usual ‘junk mail’ for take-away pizza restaurants and estate agents, hence many 
people simply binned it without even noticing it.  
The NHS also set up an internet page,
11
 entitled ‘Better Information Means Better Care’, on 
which British residents could log their comments, scheduled to be reviewed in Spring 2015, 
i.e. long after the patients’ data would have been ‘harvested’. As discussed in Section IV 
below, that blog contains many entries demonstrating the profound discomfort felt by many 
UK citizens, not least with the opening of the database to commercial researchers from both 
the pharmaceutical/medical diagnostics industry and the insurance industry.  
The facts that the UK government is portraying a ‘good news’ message to its public, and yet 
that the darker shadow of commercial involvement is ever-present, are aptly illustrated by a 
single issue of one of the UK’s major national newspapers, The Times. On the front page of 
that newspaper, the good news story was that: 
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  We will discuss the legal framework pertaining to the Information Centre in Section VI. 
10
  NHS (2014) Better information means better care, London: NHS. 
11
  http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/records/healthrecords/Pages/care-data.aspx 
6 
 
Millions of patient records … have been harnessed into a single database to create 
the biggest cancer registration service in the world. … It paves the way for highly 
personalised treatment of each cancer patient.
12
 
However, further inside the newspaper, it was reported that: 
Jeremy Hunt became the latest minister to be caught out arriving at Cabinet with 
sensitive papers clearly visible … The documents, marked “restricted”, revealed plans 
to create a government-owned company to handle the genetic code of 100,000 NHS 
patients … The document also revealed that a quango set up last year to act as a 
“dating agency” between the NHS and lucrative clients overseas was yet to make 
great headway.
13
 
The primary function of the NHS is to supply top quality medical care at a cost that the UK 
taxpayer can afford. With spiralling costs and dwindling funding, this is a challenge that was 
addressed in Sir Ian Carruthers’ 2011 briefing paper Innovation Health and Wealth, 
Accelerating Adoption and Diffusion in the NHS.
14
 In that paper, hidden amongst the 
management speech, were three specific recommendations relevant to the topic of this 
paper: introduction of greater efficiencies in practice and scrapping of out-dated, inefficient 
practices; adoption of new, effective treatment practices; and ‘collaboration’ in the 
                                                           
12
  M Barrow, ‘Personalised cancer files to save thousands of lives’ (2013) The Times 
(London, 12 June 2013) 1. 
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  C Smyth, ‘Hunt gives a brief look at slow progress of NHS business plan’ (2013) The Times 
(London, 12 June 2013) 4. 
14
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development of new treatments. The first is clearly intended to reduce overall costs. The 
second threatens to involve increases in costs. As a counterbalance to such increases, the 
third recommendation, ‘collaboration’ in the development of new treatments, is the one we 
are primarily concerned with here. It could follow a number of pathways, but some of those 
risk eroding the trust that the public has in the NHS.  
Section II of this paper will highlight the most relevant parts of the Carruthers report. In this 
regard, we consider that the NHS would do well to look to some controversies that have 
emerged in recent years with regard to the research and intellectual property practices of 
certain players in the life sciences industry.
15
 Hence, in Section III, we will take a close look 
at one of those controversies, involving the direct-to-consumer genetic testing company 
23andMe. The fallout from the company’s actions highlights the fragility of trust in the 
context of health research. We will contextualise the 23andMe  case study by discussing the 
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  Not only controversies regarding practices in industry are relevant. The NHS would also 
do well to give serious consideration, in the further implementation of its innovation 
agenda, to the UK’s experiences with past breaches of trust, such as Alder Hey, the 
Bristol Inquiry, and more recently the Mid-Staffordshire Inquiries. The Alder Hey, Bristol 
and Mid-Staffordshire reports are available at <http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0001/hc00/0012/0012_ii.asp>, 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090811143745/http://www.bristol-
inquiry.org.uk/final_report/report/index.htm> and 
<http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/report>. See also the paper by Chris Newdick in 
this issue. 
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findings from empirical studies showing that many research participants have a desire to 
know about the commercial aspects of research projects that they (or their data or body 
material) might be involved in. In Section IV, we will draw attention to some of the 
comments on trust made on the NHS Care Data blog mentioned above, as these comments 
are strikingly similar to the ones expressed by many 23andMe customers.  
In Section V, we will comment upon the different avenues that the NHS might take to carry 
out its plan of promoting collaborations with the biomedical industry and, drawing on the 
observations from Sections III and IV, we will explain why certain of those avenues may 
undermine public trust in the NHS. Finally, in Section VI, we will comment on the risks posed 
by the NHS reform to the privacy, autonomy, and moral integrity of NHS patients. 
II. THE NEW NHS INNOVATION AGENDA: ‘COLLABORATION’ IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
NEW TREATMENTS 
As the healthcare provider for all UK residents, the NHS possesses an immense quantity of 
genotypic and phenotypic data, and has access to millions of patients’ bodies and tissue 
samples. The NHS data bank is a goldmine for companies seeking to develop drugs or 
diagnostic tests. Indeed, the bodies of its patients, their body samples, and their data could 
well be described as the ‘family jewels’ of the NHS.  
However, the new NHS policy of fostering collaboration in the development of new 
practices or treatments raises the spectre that patients’ bodies, body parts or data could be 
hired out or sold to the biomedical industry for use in research and product development 
9 
 
without due consideration of ethical issues and without a compensating ‘kick-back’ in terms 
of reduced product-access costs. 
In the Carruthers report we find comments such as: 
It is a key goal of the NHS for every willing patient to be a research patient... The 
greater the number of patients involved in research, the wider the public benefit. 
The NHS could and should do more to explain to patients the benefits both to them 
and to society at large of their agreement to participate in clinical trials and 
approved research.
16
 
The [Academic Health Science Centre] … is distinguished by its … competitive 
approach to the management of [intellectual property], strong track record of 
productive research collaborations with the life sciences industry and emerging 
clinical data informatics platforms.
17
 
The existing Intellectual Property strategy is no longer fit for purpose and needs to 
be updated.
18
 
These comments may seem unrelated but they are not. First, the good news – there will be 
new treatments and so we should all be happy. But then the bad news – the cost that we 
may have to pay is that monopoly prices are charged. 
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Given the plans of the NHS and the UK government to ‘foster innovation’, the question 
arises as to what ethical and legal problems these plans may involve, especially in relation to 
patient and public trust in the NHS. Since the plans draw the NHS into the commercial 
sphere, let us first look at the controversy that has arisen with regard to the research and 
intellectual property practices of one particular company in the life sciences industry. 
III. THE FRAGILITY OF TRUST: THE 23ANDME CONTROVERSY 
23andMe is a Californian direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing company.
19
 DTC genetic 
testing has been held out to consumers as a ‘fun’ way of obtaining information about one’s 
genetic make-up, for example one’s ancestral heritage. It has also been presented, in 
particular by 23andMe, as an opportunity to collaborate in a pain- and risk-free manner in 
medical research that could result in tests and treatments that would benefit mankind. 
As DTC genetic testing companies recruit more customers, they can amass increasingly large 
informational (DNA) ‘biobanks’. In and of themselves, such DNA biobanks are of little value. 
However, when linked with phenotypic information, they become extremely valuable for 
biomedical research. Accordingly, some DTC genetic testing companies have sought to 
increase the value of their databases by asking customers to complete questionnaires to 
provide phenotypic information. 
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23andMe provides its customers with the opportunity to consent ‘to the use of their data 
for research’.
20
  The company has focused on, for example, Parkinson’s disease (PD) and 
sarcoma.
21
 The company website states that letting consumers participate in research ‘can 
produce revolutionary findings that will benefit us all’ and challenges customers to ‘join an 
effort to translate basic research into improved health care for everyone’.
22
 
However, these encouragements to advance research for the public good stand in contrast 
with 23andMe’s announcement on 28 May 2012 that it was to be granted a US Patent
23
 on 
the very next day. The diagnostic method claims
24
 in 23andMe’s US patent are similar to 
patent claims held by Myriad Genetics for assays for BRCA1/2 genetic anomalies correlating 
to propensity for breast and ovarian cancer, i.e. the type of patent claim that might be used 
to prevent other companies from carrying out a screening test for susceptibility for PD.
25
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  CB Do and others, ‘Web-based genome-wide association study identifies two novel loci 
and a substantial genetic component for Parkinson's disease’ (2011) PLoS Genetics, 
7:e1002141. 
21
  23andMe, ‘23andWe Research’ (2012), available at 
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  23andMe, above, n 11. 
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25
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Court’s decision in Mayo v. Prometheus from March 2012, i.e. after 23andMe’s patent 
application was accepted but before it was granted. See Mayo Collaborative Services, 
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CEO Anne Wojcicki announced on the company website (The Spittoon) that the goal of the 
patent was to ensure that the underlying research could lead ‘towards successful translation 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
DBA Mayo Medical Laboratories, et al. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.  566 U.S. ____ 
(2012), 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). The Court found that methods based on ‘laws of nature’ 
and consisting of well-understood, routine and conventional steps are not patentable. 
The possibility of patent claims to the types of DNA actually used in diagnostic tests (e.g. 
probes) or in commercial production of protein drugs (e.g. cDNA) is little affected by the 
13 June 2013 decision of the US Supreme Court in AMP v. Myriad in which the Court 
unanimously found that isolated human genes are unpatentable. See Association for 
Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. et al.  569 U.S._(2013). The recent 
history of the 23andMe PD case is convoluted but nonetheless interesting. On 20 April 
2012, 23andMe filed a divisional patent application on, inter alia, the use of one specific 
DNA abnormality, rs11755699, referred to by one of the bloggers on The Spittoon as the 
most significant abnormality. On 21 March 2013, 23andMe’s patent attorneys expressly 
withdrew the divisional application leaving no further extension of 23andMe’s case still 
pending. This is decidedly unusual – patent attorneys normally allow cases to lapse 
through inaction when the case is of no further interest to their clients (after all, the 
clients may change their minds). The PD patent, however, has neither been expressly 
abandoned nor ‘dedicated to the public’ (i.e. made available for use without any licence 
agreement). 
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of this discovery’ and that the patent would ‘be important for a biotech or pharmaceutical 
company to pursue drug development’.
26
  
Patenting is normal practice for any technology-based industry, but in the (bio-) 
pharmaceutical sector, patents are considered to be vital, for example to raise venture 
capital or justify further investment. Thus, the mere fact that 23andMe is participating in 
patenting activities seems quite normal. Yet, although the company has filed various patent 
applications, until June 2012 it had only drawn the attention of its customers to one patent 
case, the PD patent. Moreover, the communication was made the day before the US Patent 
was granted – even though the application on which it was based was filed in 2009 and the 
underlying research results were published in PLoS Genetics in 2011
27
 and then very rapidly 
drawn to the attention of its user community. The delay in drawing attention to the patent 
application seems odd, as 23andMe even recently underlined that ’open dialogue about 
complicated issues like patents is important’ and that it wanted to be ‘as open as possible 
about our intentions, including letting people know about our patent and why we have filed 
it’.
28
 The announcement immediately sparked controversy amongst various users and 
research participants of 23andMe, as we will illustrate below. 
How likely is it that these events might result in a loss of trust?  It is possible that various 
customers will withdraw their support because they do not consider such activities to be in 
                                                           
26
  A Wojcicki, ‘Announcing 23andMe's First Patent’ (2012), available at 
<http://spittoon.23andme.com/news/announcing-23andmes-first-patent/>. 
27
  Do and others, above, n 9. 
28
  Wojcicki, above, n 14. 
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line with their altruistic participation in research projects. As one customer wrote on 
23andMe’s blog after the announcement of the patent: ‘this is simply crowd-sourced greed. 
As a long-time 23andme customer, this patent is extremely disappointing and alarming. Our 
family is done with your service’.  Or, as another contributor put it: ‘By the way, I am a 
23andMe subscriber … and it feels good to know that we can, in some small way, contribute 
to good research. The patent pursuit, however, makes me feel uncomfortable’. 
This is not a case of 23andMe not meeting the participants’ explicit expectations – they did 
that by finding the biomarkers. It is more a case of suggesting that one will build something 
with communal resources, building it, and then claiming ownership and (potentially) 
charging for access. The implied suggestion that the result would be a community good was 
misleading. An analogy might help: A company in a village by a river says: ‘the village needs 
a bridge – give us the wood and we’ll build it’; the wood is given; the bridge is built; but the 
company then charges a toll. In both cases, the contributors (research participants/ 
villagers) failed to realize that contribution did not guarantee public ownership. The fault 
lies not in 23andMe/the builder owning the result, but in the lack of transparency in the 
appeal for the necessary contributions. The contributors did not understand what was going 
on until after their contribution was made, and, had they understood, many might not have 
contributed. Having been misled, contributors may in future be less likely to contribute to 
the attainment of public goods, fearing that they might not after all be public – which, in 
turn, might lead to a more morally impoverished community. 
The trust issue is not only related to the nature of the goals the company or research 
institution is pursuing (profit driven or not), but also to the extent of transparency 
surrounding the company or institution’s strategies. We will come back to this in Section V. 
15 
 
As for transparency, the question of whether the 23andMe participants had given truly 
informed consent, is clearly regarded as crucial by various commentators. For example, as 
noted by another contributor to the 23andMe blog: ‘It would seem that the ethics of one 
company profiting from the knowledge of others because it patented a gene variant could 
do with some scrutiny, especially if it turns out that patients, who provided samples …, were 
not aware that the results would be patented’.
29
  
                                                           
29
  23andMe responded as follows to this comment: ‘We make reference to our intent to 
pursue intellectual property rights for discoveries made from our research in both [our] 
Terms of Service … and in our research Consent document …’. (Wojcicki, above, n  14) 
The passages in question mention that 23andMe might develop intellectual property and 
that participants have no right to share in any profits. See ‘Terms of Service’, available at 
<https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/>. The Consent document provides that: ‘If 
23andMe develops intellectual property and/or commercializes products or services, 
directly or indirectly, based on the results of this study, you will not receive any 
compensation’. (See ‘Consent document’, available at 
<https://www.23andme.com/about/consent/>). However, the word ‘patent’ itself is only 
used in the context of information presented to the users. As stated in the Terms of 
Service (supra): ‘You agree that 23andMe … own all legal right ... in and to the Services, 
including any intellectual property rights which subsist in the Services … You further 
acknowledge and agree that the Services … contain proprietary and confidential 
information that is protected by applicable intellectual property … laws. You further 
acknowledge and agree that information presented to you through the Services … is 
protected by … patents …’. 
16 
 
The wording used by no means made it clear that patents would be sought for the research 
results. Various users indicated that they were unaware that 23andMe was planning to 
apply for patents, whereas, as noted by one of the bloggers: ‘everyone coming to 
[23andMe’s] service, either by paying it or by funded invitation … needs to know clearly 
what this is about and make their own informed decision to join or not’. 
We do not suggest that 23andMe has done their research without consent; moreover we do 
not suggest that they have ‘hidden’ the results of their research from their public. The issue 
is rather whether the consent extended to patenting of results. Participants in a study may 
consent to donate biological materials and phenotypic data for the development of clinical 
applications. However, if they are not aware that this might be happening through 
commercialization involving patents, this might undermine the original trust.
30
  Moreover, it 
                                                           
30
  The position of intellectual property rights (IPRs) deriving from material and data 
provided by the public is also relevant to the ‘UK Biobank’, a repository of information 
and body material from half a million UK citizens. The UK Biobank’s current position is 
that IPRs deriving from research on biobank materials will belong to the researchers, 
although it reserves the right to claim a non-exclusive, sublicensable, worldwide, non-
terminable licence if such IPRs unreasonably block healthcare research or access to 
healthcare. See UK Biobank, ‘Material Transfer Agreement for data and/or samples, 
Terms and Conditions’, Section 3.8, available at <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Material-Transfer-Agreement.pdf>. The word ‘unreasonable’ 
needs to be viewed with a degree of suspicion – since UK Biobank accepts that patents 
may be applied for, and therefore that they may be enforced, ‘unreasonable’ must mean 
17 
 
might show the original consent to be invalid for, if participants were not told clearly ‘what 
it was about’, they were not able to make ‘their own informed decisions to join or not’. 
These words, of one of the contributors to the blog reacting to the PD patent, illustrate a 
core ethical value that is frequently said to underlie consent, i.e. that consent serves to 
respect and promote the autonomy of people considering participating.
31
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
something more than ‘makes research or healthcare expensive in the way that patents 
often do’. 
31
  See, for example, Chester v. Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 (HL), where Lord Steyn described 
consent as protecting ‘respect for autonomy and dignity’. Obviously, informed consent 
remains an imperfect tool to protect participants from being harmed. See for example: I 
Huntington and W Robinson, ‘The many ways of saying yes and no: Reflections on the 
research coordinator’s role in recruiting research participants and obtaining informed 
consent’ (2007) 29 (3) IRB: Ethics and Human Research 6-10; J Sugarman and others, 
’Empirical research on informed consent. An annotated bibliography’ (1999) 29 (1) 
Hastings Center Report S1-42; KE Ormond and others, ‘Assessing the understanding of 
biobank participants’ (2009) 149 (2) American Journal of Medical Genetics Part A 188-
198. For example, participants do not always read informed consent forms, and even 
those who do frequently do not understand them (Huntington and Robinson 2007, 
supra). Moreover, many people decide to participate before the consent process is 
finalized. See AF Cook and H Hoas, ‘Trading places: What the research participant can tell 
the investigator about informed consent’ (2011) 2 (8)  Journal of Clinical Research and 
Bioethics 2. Onora O’Neill disagrees with the claim that consent is ethically important 
because ‘it secures some form of individual autonomy, however conceived’. In her view, 
18 
 
Although it may be impossible to inform people of all possible uses of their material or data, 
the consent document should contain sufficient and sufficiently clear information to allow 
the individual to decide whether the project accords with her moral values and 
aspirations.
32
 As argued by bioethicist Julian Savulescu regarding the use of left-over body 
material:  
To ask a person’s permission to do something to that person is to involve her actively 
and to give her the opportunity to make the project a part of her plans. When we 
involve people in our projects without their consent we use them as a means to our 
own ends.
33
  
Indeed, the reason why a participant may perceive a research project as conflicting with her 
moral values may relate specifically to its commercial or intellectual property aspects. As 
observed by a 23andMe user:  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the importance of consent is related to the fact that it ‘provides reasonable assurance 
that a patient (research subject, tissue donor) has not been deceived or coerced’. See O 
O’Neill, ‘Some limits of informed consent’ (2009) 29 (1) Journal of Medical Ethics 4-7, at 
5. We do not have the space to enter this debate here, but we agree with O’Neill that 
consent, no matter how necessary in certain contexts, can never be sufficient justification 
for action in medicine or elsewhere. 
32
  TL Beauchamp and JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford University Press: 
New York, 7
th
 edn, 2012). 
33
  J Savulescu, ‘For and Against: No consent should be needed for using leftover body 
material for scientific purposes. Against’ (2000) 325 (7365) BMJ 648-651, at 649. 
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[S]tating that ‘it is written in sections ... that people signed’ is not close to a decent 
answer to people you asked for partnering with you to advance research on PD. A 
company can be for profit or for social profit. You have the right to choose any form 
you like …, but please make it clear. If you choose to be for profit only, I don’t think 
you used the right messaging to call for participation of people … And remember you 
can only play it once. Trust is not something you can reclaim easily.  
The point is not that there is anything inherently wrong in trying to make a profit or creating 
business revenues, but rather that conflict may be perceived if the research institution is 
portraying a transparent, altruistic, and common-good image, as 23andMe has clearly been 
doing and as the NHS is also doing. As expressed by one blogger: ‘I would not have talked 
my mother and others in my support group into participating if I had understood this was 
going to be a profit driven enterprise. I believe 23andMe has been disingenuous in gathering 
a free database’.
 
Research shows that many participants wish to know about commercial aspects of research 
projects they might participate in.
34
 Would this information make them change their minds 
about participating? Cook and Hoas conducted an interview study exploring the decision-
making processes that participants use when deciding to participate in research. They found 
that a relationship of trust with a healthcare provider or researcher seems to influence the 
                                                           
34
  See, for example: Cook  and Hoas, above, n 25; and KP Weinfurt and others, ‘Disclosure 
of financial relationships to participants in clinical research’ (2009) 361  New England 
Journal of Medicine 916-921. 
20 
 
decisions.
35
 Moreover, they found that most participants desired more information about 
the commercial context of the research and that the information they had been given was 
not sufficient to enable them to realize that some studies have commercial purposes: 
Participants thought it was dishonest not to be transparent about … the full 
purpose of a study and said that hiding such information would not be acceptable. 
Most (90%) wanted to know whether a study had such a commercial purpose and 
the vast majority (80%) reported that disclosure of such information could 
influence their decisions about participating in research in the future. Said one 
participant: “[T]he person should know the purpose of the study … I think the study 
participant should be told exactly what is going on. It’s coercion otherwise. … ” Said 
another [participant]: “Patents. Sure… I absolutely want to know” … Among those 
who said it would not influence their decisions about participation, they still felt 
they should be informed about such issues.
36
 
The participants believed that the conduct of and participation in research studies should 
include some level of altruism or mutuality on the part of both the researcher and the 
participant.
37
 
IV. PUBLIC TRUST IN THE NHS REFORM: A SIMILAR CONTROVERSY 
                                                           
35
  Cook and Hoas, above, n 25. 
36
  Cook and Hoas, above n 25,  at 4-5. 
37
  Cook and Hoas, above n 25, at 6. 
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As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, the NHS has set up a blog for citizens 
wishing to comment on the collection of health-related data by the Information Centre set 
up by the Health and Social Care Act 2010. In this Section, we will provide a few examples of 
the many comments that have been posted. These quotes, from five commentators, 
capture to a large extent the concerns raised by all the commentators:
 38
 
Neither the government nor the NHS has the right to sell [my medical records] 
either for profit or for the advantage of private companies, business interests or 
political advantage. 
A leaflet was pushed through the door the other day with the rest of the pizza, 
curry and loft insulation bumf … On reading it, it states the NHS’s intention to 
“share” (they mean sell) all our medical details… [T]he NHS want to sell you 
intimate medical details to anybody with the money to buy … [b]ut they aren’t 
asking your permission, oh no, they’re going to do it anyway… 
It’s about disclosing private and personal information to undisclosed third parties. 
… [I]t has all the hallmarks of an attempt to privately acquire the “right” to gather 
private medical data about the majority of the British public without them realising. 
… [T]his is a crafty way of maximising the number of those whose data will be 
harvested either without their knowledge, or through inertia. … Am I alone in 
feeling intimidated? 
There is no guarantee that my data will be used ethically. … 
                                                           
38
  http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/records/healthrecords/Pages/care-data.aspx 
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I think it is good for medical data to be shared, and hence accessible, throughout 
the NHS. BUT I am not happy with any prospect that this information be shared 
with any commercial organisation. 
The outrage of these NHS patients with the possibility of personal medical data being used 
for commercial ends that do not tie in with the individuals’ values, clearly reflects the 
outrage felt by many customers of 23andMe. However (un)realistic the concerns reported 
may be, the point remains the same – ‘You are losing my trust’.  
Two general questions arise, to which the answer is not yet clear. Is the primary goal of the 
new policy to profit from the ‘family jewels’ of the NHS by selling or leasing out access, or by 
data-mining and patenting the findings? Or is it to get top quality new treatments to all NHS 
patients who need them at an affordable cost and with minimum delay, to be done by 
facilitating the discovery and development phases? 
Further, several more specific questions arise. Why has the government chosen to 
communicate the new policy to the population through a junk mail leaflet? As noted by a 
representative of the public campaign medConfidential: 
That your family’s medical confidentiality could rest on spotting a single evasively-
worded junk mail leaflet makes an absolute mockery of both transparency and of 
consent.
39
 
                                                           
39
  Phil Booth, quoted in Shah, Sooraj (2014) Patients’ data ‘can’t be used for marketing or 
selling insurance premiums’, says NHS, Computing/share, 21 January 2014. Available at 
http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2324170/patients-data-cant-be-used-for-
marketing…. 
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Why does the leaflet not state clearly that the new policy allows for the health data of NHS 
patients to be used for commercial benefit? Instead, it contains vague wording, for example 
that data will be shared with “approved organisations”, without any further specification. 
V. WHAT IS THE GOAL OF THE NHS REFORM WITH ITS FOCUS ON INNOVATION? 
In this Section we will discuss the possible goals of the NHS reform with its focus on 
fostering innovation. Top quality healthcare is becoming ever more expensive. The NHS’s 
new policy of increasing its involvement in innovation can take one or more of a limited set 
of forms, involving research at the three stages of discovery, regulatory clearance, and post-
registration, and using the resources of patient data, body material, patients, and NHS staff 
and facilities.  
Let us first look at the possible scenarios in each of the three stages of research. For the 
discovery phase, NHS involvement might take the form of state- or industry-funded research 
by NHS staff. This leads to the questions of which party would own the intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) that result, and whether the NHS, if not the IPR owner, would have a share in 
any subsequent profits or would have access to the ultimate products at a reduced price. 
Since NHS staff involved in discovery stage research are frequently also university 
employees, the problem may arise that those universities may claim full or partial 
ownership of the IPR. Alternately, discovery stage research could be carried out by non-NHS 
entities but using NHS resources of patient data and/or body material. This could be 
24 
 
research carried out by a Contract Research Organisation (CRO)
40
 but funded by the NHS, or 
research funded by the non-NHS entity itself. In the first case the IPR owner would probably 
be the NHS, in the second it will depend on the conditions that the NHS lays down for access 
to its resources. The NHS could, for example, follow the IPR policy that has been adopted by 
the UK Biobank of accepting that the IPRs will belong to the entity carrying out the research 
but requiring a royalty-free, sub-licensable licence when the IPRs are being used 
‘unreasonably’ to restrict health-related research and/or access to healthcare.
41
 Or it could 
follow an entirely different policy. The Carruthers report does not make clear what is to be 
understood by a ‘competitive approach’ to the management of intellectual property or what 
the planned ’update’ of the intellectual property strategy will entail. 
As regards the second stage, i.e. regulatory clearance, one of the questions that arise is 
whether the attitude to regulatory clearance data exclusivity will be as tough as it usually is 
in industry.
42
 Data exclusivity is commonly used as a means to delay market entry by generic 
                                                           
40
  See, for example: JE Winter and J Baguley (Eds), Outsourcing Clinical Development. 
Strategies for working with CROs and other partners (Gower Publishing: Aldershot, 2006); 
and J Fisher, Medical Research for Hire. The political economy of pharmaceutical clinical 
trials (Rutgers University Press: Piscataway, 2009). We do not have space here to 
comment on the broader trend of out-sourcing clinical research, which has given rise to 
international markets with strong competition for clinical trial revenues, a trend which 
risks erosion of research ethics. 
41
  UK Biobank, above, n 24. 
42
  See, for example, N Tuominen, ‘An IP perspective on defensive patenting strategies of 
the EU pharma industry’ (2012) 34(8) European Intellectual Property Review 541-551. 
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competitors once a pharmaceutical patent expires. The suggestion has been made by 
Jerome Reichman that clinical trials should be performed wholly or partially at state 
expense, with the data then being open to others to use. The argument goes that by 
transferring the major expense of bringing a new drug to market onto the state, pharma 
might then launch new products at more affordable prices. With the continuing existence of 
patents, this seems like a pipedream as far as initial prices after launch are concerned – 
however, should the NHS choose to sponsor trials in fields where the cost of existing drugs 
is prohibitive, it could, perhaps, encourage new entrants to develop new drugs not covered 
by existing patents, and to request NHS funding of regulatory clearance trials. One effect 
might be to introduce competition in the marketplace and to push prices downwards. A 
further effect, one to be hoped for, could be that drugs might be developed for diseases 
which do not occur so frequently in developed countries that the manufacturer could 
otherwise hope to recoup research and regulatory clearance costs solely by monopoly-
pricing in a patent-bound market.
43
 The NHS could, of course, choose to carry out clinical 
trials on selected drugs at its own expense so as to achieve this longer term goal of 
introducing price competition, and hence of lowering its expenditure on drugs, where such 
competition seems likely to occur and where current overinflated prices make it desirable to 
reduce costs over time. 
                                                           
43
  JH Reichman, ‘Rethinking the role of clinical trial data in international intellectual 
property law: the case for a public goods approach’ (2009) 13 (1) Marquette Intellectual 
Property Law Review 1-68. See also P Andanda, ‘Managing intellectual property rights 
over clinical trial data to promote access and benefit sharing in public health’ (2013) 
44(2) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 140-177. 
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Research in the regulatory clearance phase, e.g. clinical trials, could be carried out on NHS 
patients, for example within NHS hospitals, and involve the participation of NHS staff.  This 
could be funded by the NHS itself, for example where the treatment has been discovered by 
or for the NHS and where the NHS is the IPR owner. Alternatively, it could be industry-
funded (i.e. as has been normal practice up to now). Where research is NHS-funded, the 
question arises as to what the NHS’s role would be when the regulatory clearance is gained, 
e.g. would the NHS become a licensor of industry or a competitor to industry?  
Where research aimed at regulatory clearance is industry-funded, the question arises as to 
whether the fee paid to the NHS or its staff is sufficient or, if not, whether the NHS would 
subsequently take a share in the profits or have access to the resultant product at a reduced 
price. Alternatively, the view might merely be that industry-funded research facilitates the 
emergence of new treatments and that this alone is sufficient to justify the emphasis in the 
Carruthers report on encouraging all NHS patients to become research subjects. 
What about research in the third stage, the post-registration stage? For existing treatments, 
i.e. post-registration, patient data could be analysed to determine whether specific 
treatments might be ‘retired’ or to determine which of various alternative treatments 
should be selected and under which conditions. The example of using GP (family doctor) 
data to determine which of the available statins should be prescribed is given by Ben 
Goldacre. As he points out,
44
 after a drug has reached the market, the patient data that is 
then collected may be particularly useful since it goes far beyond the data collected during 
regulatory clearance.  
                                                           
44
  B Goldacre, Bad Pharma – How drug companies mislead doctors and harm patients, 
(Fourth Estate: London, 2012), at 231-2. 
27 
 
The position concerning possible NHS research involvement explained above can be 
visualised more clearly if seen as an array, much like a Rubik’s cube. Thus, for the purposes 
of this paper, the different forms that research can take under the NHS innovation agenda 
can be set out along three dimensions: the level of transparency; the goal of the research; 
and the subjects used for the research.  
The subjects used can be: (i) patient data; (ii) patient body material (e.g. tissue samples); or 
(iii) living patients’ bodies (e.g. in the case of clinical trials), or some combination of these. 
Obviously, different legal and ethical questions may be at issue in each case. Below we will 
comment on some of the problems arising with regard to research involving patient data. 
We cannot elaborate here on the specific problems involved in research on human body 
material or in clinical trials. Concerning the latter, the question obviously arises as to 
whether the new NHS policy of regarding every patient as a potential trial subject poses a 
risk of undue influence being exerted,
45
 given that the NHS provides free healthcare and any 
UK patient without private health insurance is entirely dependent upon the NHS for that 
healthcare and might, as a result, be reluctant to refuse to join clinical trials. Moreover, this 
raises a particular conflict for the NHS in cases where it would benefit financially from the  
outcome of trials or where it would make a profit from performing trials. 
As to transparency, three scenarios are conceivable, namely where the research (whether 
on patient data, body material, or patients themselves) is done:  
                                                           
45
  Laurie and Postan (above, n 20, at 401) talk of ‘a power imbalance which belies the 
putatively empowering nature of the consent process.’ 
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scenario 1:  with the informed consent of the patients (or at least after consultation, see 
the following Section);  
scenario 2:  with the participants having been incorrectly led to believe that the research 
only aims to benefit patients, i.e. with invalid consent; or  
scenario 3:   without the participants having been advised that research is taking place, 
i.e. without any consultation, let alone consent.  
Finally, as to the goal of the research, this may be to: (a) develop or improve treatments; (b) 
reduce access prices for new treatments; or (c) make a profit for the NHS in order to reduce 
its demands on the taxpayer. 
In scenarios (2) and (3) mentioned above, the NHS seriously risks the loss of patient and 
public trust when the truth comes out. However, if  a profit motive is present, the erosion of 
trust is likely to be vastly greater, as is illustrated by the case of 23andMe and the comments 
on the NHS Care Data webpage discussed earlier. In general, it seems that the most 
problematic scenarios, i.e. those where trust is most likely to be eroded, would be those 
with no transparency, a profit motive present, and involving a clinical trial. The least 
problematic (but not necessarily unproblematic) scenarios would be those where 
transparency is provided, the goal is new and improved therapies, and the research is 
carried out only on data or body material. 
VI. RISKS TO THE PRIVACY, AUTONOMY AND MORAL INTEGRITY OF NHS PATIENTS 
29 
 
Where patients cannot prevent their data or body material from being used for research, 
this represents an erosion of their autonomy.
46
 We will come back to the relevance of 
autonomy later in this section. However, in addition to autonomy, two other fundamental 
ethical values are at stake here: privacy (the right to a personal sphere free from public 
attention and intrusion); and moral integrity (as persons, patients deserve respect for who 
they are and for the values, preferences, and commitments they subscribe to). These values, 
and the ways in which they intersect, will be briefly touched upon in this section. 
As to privacy, Part 9, Chapter 2 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 establishes a 
company, the ‘Information Centre’, to which essentially all confidential patient information 
from UK health care professionals will be provided, thereby creating the (data) goldmine 
mentioned earlier. In an impressive analysis published in this journal,
47
 Jamie Grace and 
Mark Taylor explain that the 2012 Act allows this data to be used for purposes that extend 
beyond patient care (e.g. for research) without any consultation, i.e. without the patients’ 
knowledge. Thus, the 2012 Act makes it impossible for patients to prevent their data from 
being used for research. 
                                                           
46
  SL Tobin and others, ‘Customers or research participants? Guidance for research 
practices in commercialization of personal genomics’ (2012) 14 (10) Genetics in Medicine 
833-835. 
47
  J Grace and MJ Taylor, ‘Disclosure of Confidential Patient Information and the Duty to 
Consult: the Role of the Health and Social Care Information Centre’ (2013) 21 (3) Med L 
Rev 415-447. 
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Under the Data Protection Act 1998,
48
 any health professional gathering personal 
information directly from a patient has a responsibility to advise the patient of the intended 
uses of the information, unless this would be impracticable. However, as Grace and Taylor 
point out,
49
 in this regard the Data Protection Act may be overridden by the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012, since the direct recipient of the information from the patient, the 
patient’s physician, is obliged to forward such information to the new ‘Information Centre’ 
which itself is not obliged to inform the patient of the use of such data once ‘anonymised’.
50
 
This has far-reaching consequences: 
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  S 2(1)(a), Part II, Schedule 1. 
49
  Grace and Taylor, above, n 43. 
50
  Interestingly, a number of commentators draw attention to the impossibility of 
anonymising or de-identifying patient data. See, for example: AL McGuire and RA Gibbs, 
‘No Longer De-Identified’ (2006) 312 Science 370-371; WW Lowrance and FS Collins, 
‘Identifiability in Genomic Research’ (2007) 317 (5838)  Science 600-602; D Greenbaum, J 
Du and M Gerstein, ‘Genomic Anonymity: Have We Already Lost It?’ (2008) 8 (10) 
American Journal of Bioethics 71-74; M Wjst, ‘Caught You: Threats to Confidentiality Due 
to the Public Release of Large-Scale Genetic Data Sets’ (2010) 11 (21) BMC Medical Ethics 
1-4. Greenbaum and colleagues noted that the distinction between identifiable and non-
identifiable genomic information is becoming increasingly less meaningful: ‘Particularly 
as industries such as personal genomics expand—flooding both private and public 
databases with readily identifiable genomic data—they will effectively prevent an ever-
growing number of individuals from remaining genetically anonymous ... In fact, recent 
research has already shown that individual genomes can be readily identified out of 
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[T]he Information Centre will have the power, under section 259 [of the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012], to require confidential patient information (and other 
information) from health and social care bodies ...
51
 [A] disclosure to the Information 
Centre, in response to a requirement that it be provided, ... will not constitute a 
breach of the common law duty of confidence and will satisfy the requirement that 
there is a lawful basis for the processing of sensitive personal data under Schedule 3 
of the Data Protection Act 1998.
52
 
Consequently, as observed by Grace and Taylor, the right of a patient to object to processing 
of his personal data on the basis that it would be likely to cause ‘substantial damage or 
substantial distress to him or to another, and that damage or distress is or would be 
unwarranted’ (cf. Section 10 of the Data Protection Act 1998) is simply removed as a result 
of the Health and Social Care Act 2012: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
larger mixed groups of publicly available data from genome wide association studies 
using only a small subset of one’s genome’. Supra, at 71 (reference omitted). Wjst points 
out that: ‘[I]t seems necessary to increase public awareness of genetic privacy and to 
inform probands [i.e. patients] continuously about the use of their samples and data ... 
The risks of re-identification of anonymized data should be included in informed consent 
procedures, and any data sharing needs to be explicitly approved by the DNA donor. … 
data sets with more than 100 SNP markers should be removed from public web servers if 
not explicitly endorsed by the donor. ... data access should be restricted to scientific 
collaborations under confidentiality agreements only’. Supra, at 3-4 (references omitted). 
51
  Grace and Taylor, above, n 43, at 430. 
52
  Grace and Taylor, above, n 43, at 432 (footnotes omitted). 
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[T]he responsibility to consult the patient and provide her with the opportunity to 
object] is lifted in relation to both the Information Centre and health professionals if 
disclosure of the information has been required by the Information Centre.
53
 
This clearly represents an erosion of patient autonomy. We should like once again to quote 
bioethicist Savulescu: 
Each mature person should be the author of his or her own life. Each person has 
values, plans, aspirations, and feelings about how that life should go. People have 
values which may collide with research goals ... When we involve people in our 
projects without their consent we use them as a means to our own ends.
54 
This comment was regarding the use of body materials, but applies equally to the use of 
personal data for research purposes. Indeed, people can only exercise their autonomy as 
regards uses of their data and/or body material if they have received sufficient information; 
thus the right to be informed about intended uses of one’s data (or body material) is a 
precondition to the protection of the fundamental rights to autonomy and personal respect. 
Grace and Taylor explain how the relationship between these rights is clear from the Data 
Protection Act 1998: 
One of the ... rights of data subjects (which cannot be exercised if they are in 
ignorance of the [data] processing) is the right, contained within section 10 of the 
                                                           
53
  Grace and Taylor, above, n 43, at 435-436, emphasis added. 
54
  Savulescu, above, n 27. See also R Rhodes, ‘Rethinking Research Ethics’ (2005) 5 (1) 
American Journal of Bioethics 7-28. 
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Data Protection Act, to prevent processing likely to cause him or her substantial 
damage or distress.
55
 
They argue for a duty to consult, which, their analysis shows, can be found in current UK law 
but is at risk of being undermined by the Health and Social Care Act 2012. The implications 
of such a duty are the following: 
We suggest that if someone has been ‘consulted’ over an intended use of 
information, then he or she will have received ‘sufficient reasons’ for the intended 
processing, have had ‘adequate time’ to consider those reasons, and will have had 
an opportunity to offer a response which will be ‘conscientiously taken into account’ 
prior to a decision being made.
56
 
According to Grace and Taylor, the Data Protection Act 1998, in conjunction with the 
common law duty of confidence, grounds a responsibility to take conscientious account of 
                                                           
55
  Grace and Taylor, above, n 43, at 419, referring to s 10(2) of the Data Protection Act 
1998. 
56
  Grace and Taylor, above, n 43, at 419-410, referring to R v Brent London Borough Council 
ex parte Gunning [1985] 84 LGR 168 at 169. Grace and Taylor, rightly in our view, 
emphasise that this is not equivalent to seeking consent: ‘[M]ost crucially, consent is 
something that can be withheld by an individual for any reason at all. If consent is a 
necessity, then dissent effects a prohibition. If instead the requirement is only that those 
affected have an ‘opportunity to comment’ and for their views to be ‘duly taken into 
account’, then an obligation to consult may be discharged without individual consent’. 
Grace and Taylor, above, n 43, at 443. 
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any response given by the data subject as well as a responsibility to respect any ‘reasonable 
objection’ expressed by the data subject against the intended research use.
57
 
This highlights the interrelatedness between, on the one hand, the value of autonomy and, 
on the other hand, the value of respect for persons and their moral integrity. As to the latter, 
it is clear that having personal data or body material used for purposes one is morally 
opposed to may make one feel morally complicit, which may cause substantial damage and 
distress. ‘Moral complicity’ refers to the idea that one can do wrong by being associated in 
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  Grace and Taylor, above, n 43, at 420. The common law duty of confidence entails that: 
“[C]onfidential patient information may not be used for any purpose outside the 
reasonable expectation of a patient confiding personal information in a health 
professional. This includes use by third parties if they receive the information from a 
health professional”. Grace and Taylor, above, n 43, at 421 (footnote omitted). They note 
that there are at least two circumstances in which the responsibility to consult, inherent 
to the common law, might be limited: uses of ‘de-identified’ data and uses of identifiable 
data in the public interest. As to the former, see note 46 above. With regard to uses ‘in 
the public interest’, it is clear that this cannot be invoked as a general exception (‘health 
research by definition is in the public interest’), for this exception only applies if failure to 
disclose data would risk serious harm (e.g. if national security would be breached or if 
there would be a medical danger to the public). See Grace and Taylor, above, n 43, at 
427-428. In sum, the only circumstances in which disclosure of confidential patient data 
can be justified ‘without notification and despite objection’ are where ‘disclosure is 
intended to address a serious crime or a risk to the health, safety and well-being of 
others’. Grace and Taylor, above, n 43, at 446. 
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some way with wrongdoing by others, for example by causally contributing to others’ 
wrongdoing in a certain way or by increasing the likelihood of the wrongdoing occurring 
even without causing it in any way.
58
 Allowing people to avoid moral complicity is an 
additional reason for ensuring that people have the right to be informed about and to 
object to uses of their data or body material. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We are not arguing that, prior to the NHS reform, no potentially problematic research was 
taking place within the NHS or under instructions from the NHS, but rather that the NHS 
innovation agenda and the Health and Social Care Act 2012 permit and even actively 
encourage ‘drift’ towards types of research that are more likely to erode the public’s trust in 
the NHS, i.e. towards the most problematic types of research we described in Section V. 
Is the NHS’s new policy intended primarily to enhance healthcare or is it to raise funds with 
enhanced healthcare being merely secondary? If, as seems likely in view of the language 
used in the Carruthers report and the NHS Care Data webpages, the primary purpose is to 
raise money, then it is especially important to ensure that the NHS’s policy be transparent 
and that the patients, on whose bodies, tissues and data the success of the policy depends, 
be fully informed and provided with an easy way to decline to participate. 
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  For readings on moral complicity, see C Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective 
Age (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2000); RM Green, ‘Benefiting from ‘Evil’: An 
Incipient Moral Problem in Human Stem Cell Research’ (2002) 16 (6) Bioethics 544-556; J 
Gardner, ‘Complicity and Causality’ (2007) 1 (2) Criminal Law and Philosophy 127-141. 
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The importance of this is underlined by the paucity of avenues by which NHS patients (or 
23andMe customers) may obtain legal redress should their data or body samples, or even 
their bodies, be used for purposes which they are not informed of and not in agreement 
with.
59
 
The main lesson to be drawn for the NHS seems to be that any organization involved in 
research that relies on human participation, whether through clinical trials or by providing 
information or body material or both, needs to be transparent, not only about its research 
goals but also about its strategies and policies regarding commercialization, including 
patenting and licensing policies. Such transparency is crucial to enable potential participants 
to make their own decisions as to whether those goals and policies are in line with their 
moral values, and, if so, whether they want to contribute to those goals. In the absence of 
such transparency, any talk, no matter how repeated, of ‘patient autonomy’ and ‘no 
decision about me, without me’ (one of the key phrases in Equity and excellence: Liberating 
the NHS, the 2010 report on NHS reforms planned by the coalition government),
60
 will 
continue to sound hollow. That 2010 report promised that patients will have increasing 
control over their care records:  
We will enable patients to have control of their health records. This will start with 
access to the records held by their GP and over time this will extend to health 
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  Laurie and Postan, above, n 20, at 393. 
60
  Available 
at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/21
3823/dh_117794.pdf>,, see section 2.11, page 14. 
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records held by all providers. The patient will determine who else can access their 
records...  
Yet Grace and Taylor’s analysis convincingly shows that the Health and Social Care Act 2012 
has the opposite effect: patients now have less control over who can access and use their 
healthcare data. The 2012 Act and the NHS innovation agenda pose risks, not only to the 
privacy of NHS patients, but also to their autonomy and moral integrity. 
 Trust, once lost, is not easily regained. It is to be hoped that those who are in the process of 
‘liberating’ the NHS are aware of this. 
 
